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An insufficient level of structural reforms remains a perennial phenomenon in the EU. 
Despite the gradual expansion of macroeconomic governance, legal instruments 
fostering the implementation of structural reforms have been underexploited. This 
article examines the leeway provided by EU Treaties and legislation to use existing 
and new instruments to incentivize structural reforms more forcefully. First, in light 
of the recent change in the EU Commission's enforcement practice, we highlight how 
the sanctions-based regime under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can be 
extended to incorporate structural reforms. There is significant room for manoeuvre 
to account for the implementation of structural reforms both in the preventive and the 
corrective arm of the SGP. Second, contractual agreements on structural reforms offer 
an alternative to the sanction-based system. Unlike existing instruments, contractual 
agreements allow for more egalitarian and reward-based incentives and thus deviate 
from the classic 'surveillance model' of economic governance in the EU. We can 
conceptualize such agreements in two ways: First, as agreements concluded between 
the EU and individual Member States, underpinned by financial support as an 
incentive. Second, as mutual agreements concluded between Member States, which 
agree on the implementation of structural reforms as a kind of barter trading ensuring 
reciprocity. We highlight the legal boundaries on scope and design of such agreements 
and how they relate to the institutional governance setting in the EU. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The regime governing the EU Member States' fiscal and macroeconomic 
policies has undergone significant changes over the last few years. As a 
reaction to the sovereign debt crises, the legal framework has been modified 
on various occasions and the scope of economic policy surveillance has been 
expanded significantly. At the same time, an insufficient level of structural 
reforms persists1 and has been lamented widely.2 Some of these reforms are 
                                                 
1 S Deroose and J Griesse, 'Implementing economic reforms - are EU Member States 
responding to European Semester recommendations?' (October 2014) ECOFIN 
Economic Brief, 17 <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic 
_briefs/2014/pdf/eb37_en.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016. 
2 European Commission, '2015 European Semester: Country-specific recommen-
dations' (Communication) COM (2015) 250 final; OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 
2012: Going for Growth (OECD Publishing 2012), Chapter 1; D Anderson and others, 
'Fiscal Consolidation in the Euro Area: How Much Pain Can Structural Reforms 
Ease?' (October 2013) IMF Working Paper <http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13211.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016; European Central Bank, 
'Progress with structural reforms across the euro area and their possible impacts' 
(2015) ECB Economic Bulletin, 2 <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ 
other/art01_eb201502.en.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016. 
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critical for the growth and sustainability of the euro zone as a whole, as they 
imply positive externalities across countries.3 
 
In the past, economic governance in the EU has addressed the lack of 
structural reforms mainly through five mechanisms. First, before the 
inception of the euro area, Member States coordinated their economic 
policies through the (implicit) pressure exerted through compliance with the 
convergence criteria. Second, during the first decade of the euro, structural 
reforms were incorporated into the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, but 
progress was limited mainly due to the lack of binding coordination 
mechanisms. Third, more recently significant reforms were implemented in 
countries under conditionality-based financial assistance programmes 
aiming at both fiscal and macroeconomic stability.4 However, reforms have 
been implemented only under severe pressure, while ownership for the 
reforms stayed weak. In addition, conditionality-based programmes only 
applied to a few countries in the first place – they do not offer an instrument 
to allow for a broader implementation of structural reforms going beyond 
countries under the programmes.  
 
Fourth, since the introduction of the EU 2020 strategy and the European 
Semester, the focus of the initially purely fiscal governance has been 
broadened towards other fields of economic and social policy. However, 
these instruments (still largely) remain in the sphere of 'soft coordination', 
which lacks concrete policy tools or a binding effect.5  
                                                 
3 Simulations show that the simultaneous implementation of structural reforms 
throughout the euro zone would have a bigger effect on output than they would if 
implemented by countries in isolation, highlighting the benefits of coordinated 
policy action; see European Commission, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 13(4) 
(2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/qr_euro_area/2014/pdf/q 
rea4_en.pdf> accessed 7 January 2016. 
4 F Fabbrini, 'The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political 
Process in Comparative Perspective' (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal International Law 
64, 73-74. 
5 KA Armstrong, 'The Lisbon Agenda and Europe 2020: From the Governance of 
Coordination to the Coordination of Governance' in P Copeland and D 
Papadimitriou (eds), The EU's Lisbon Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 208-228; on 
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Fifth, reforms of the binding and sanction-based EU legal framework have 
allowed for stronger surveillance within the EU, with extended mechanisms 
on fiscal and macroeconomic governance. In this vein, the Commission 
announced it would interpret the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) as offering leeway for the 
account of structural reforms under these procedures to the extent possible.6 
This avenue indeed offers opportunities to perform the existing sanction-
based surveillance system with a stronger focus on the implementation of 
structural reforms.  
 
A sixth (and as yet unexploited) enforcement mechanism relies on the idea of 
so-called Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) proposed by 
the Commission encompassing contractual arrangements to be agreed 
between Member State and the Commission underpinned by financial 
support.7 A similar idea is 'mutually agreed contractual arrangements' 
                                                 
the poor compliance record regarding the implementation of country-specific 
recommendations, see Deroose and Griesse (fn 1) 1; however, the Commission can 
indirectly incentivize the implementation of the country-specific recommendations 
based on Articles 121(2) and 148(4) TFEU in line with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1303/2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development 
Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime 
and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, OJ L 347, 
20.12.2013, p. 320–469. Based on this provision, the Commission can request the 
Member State to prioritize projects identified in the country-specific 
recommendations in order to obtain financial support from the European Structural 
and Investment Funds. 
6 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
Within the Existing Rules of the SGP' COM (2015) 12 final, 9. 
7 See the two Communications: European Commission, Towards a deep an genuine 
EMU: the introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument' 
(Communication) COM (2013) 165 final; and European Commission, 'Towards a 
deep and genuine EMU: Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy 
reforms' (Communication) COM (2013) 166 final. The contractual arrangements 
were mentioned already in the Commission's blueprint for a deep and genuine 
economic and monetary union: launching a European debate, European 
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('Vertragspartnerschaften'), floated by German Chancellor Merkel in 2012.8 
The underlying idea is to obtain 'hard' reform commitments from Member 
States without delegating more power to new or old European institutions. 
Alternatively, one may extend this idea towards bilateral agreements on 
national reform commitments between Euro members without involving the 
EU, as envisaged by a joint report from France and Germany on economic 
reforms focusing on competitiveness and investment issues.9 This joint 
report by the respective minsters of economic affairs remained purely 
political in nature without taking legal effect, but both its level of detail and 
reciprocal nature could give an indication of the possible design of bilateral 
CCIs on national reform commitments.10 Under bilateral agreements 
between Member States, reciprocity in the deal would ensure the positive 
cross-border spillovers from the domestic reforms and increase the Member 
States' otherwise lacking willingness to reform. 
 
Against this background, this analysis explores the existing (but not yet 
exploited) scope for manoeuvre provided under the current legal framework 
in promoting structural reforms (fifth and sixth issue mentioned above). On 
this basis, this contribution seeks to offer legal as well as policy insight. From 
a legal perspective, the implementation issues surrounding sanction-based 
and reward-based mechanisms have not featured prominently in the 
discourse. There are various strands of legal literature on economic 
                                                 
Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union 
Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2. 
8 N Busse and M Schäfers, 'Fahrplan für die nächsten Monate' FAZ (12 December 
2012) <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/europaeische-union/eu-gipfel-fahrplan-
fuer-die-naechsten-monate-11992749.html> accessed 7 February 2016. 
9 J Duffy, 'French-German Report to Focus on Reform and Investment' (Euro Insight, 
27 November 2014) <https://euroinsight.mni-news.com/posts/french-german-
report 
-to-focus-on-reform-and-investment> accessed 7 February 2016.  
10 The report was prepared by two academics and outlined a broad reform agenda 
covering regulatory initiatives, investment strategies and reform priorities, see H 
Enderlein and J Pisani-Ferry, 'Reforms, Investments and Growth, an agenda for 
France, Germany and Europe' <https://www.hertie-school.org/fileadmin/images/ 
Downloads/core_faculty/Henrik_Enderlein/Enderlein_Pisani_Report_EN.pdf> 
accessed 20 March 2016. 
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governance. In recent years, they focussed on the competence and legality 
issues surrounding the anti-crisis instruments employed by EU institutions11, 
the complex evolution of both soft and hard formats of governance12 and the 
overall gradual expansion of coordination methods.13 This article seeks to add 
insight into the legal feasibility of practically relevant coordination 
mechanisms (and thus also to offer policy relevance) by exploring the existing 
surveillance regime and the scope of manoeuver remaining under the current 
sanction-based rules incorporated in the Stability and Growth Pact. Also, 
only scant attention has been given to the (policy-relevant) attempts to shift 
coordination efforts into a more egalitarian direction by allowing contractual 
relationships within the multilevel EU governance system to pave the way for 
a reward-based approach towards economic policy coordination – this gap 
begs an inquiry on the different formats of contractual agreements.  
 
                                                 
11 More recently, the discussion particularly focused on the competence and legality 
review of the OMT program (Case C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, Gauweiler) and 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Case C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, 
Pringle). On the compatibility of OMT programmes with EU law, see A Steinbach, 
'The compatibility of the ECB's sovereign bond purchases with EU law and German 
constitutional law' (2013) 39 Yale Journal of International Law Online 15; Borgers, 
'Outright Monetary Transactions and the stability mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler' 
(2016) 53 CMLR 1-58; on the ESM see S Adam and FJ Mena Parras, 'The European 
Stability Mechanism through the Legal Meanderings of the Union's 
Constitutionalism: Comment on Pringle' (2013) 38 EL REV. 848, 860. 
12 On the complementarity of hard law and soft law, see M Dawson, 'Three Waves of 
New Governance in the European Union' (2011) 36 EL Rev. 208; KA Armstrong, 
'The Character of EU Law and Governance: From 'Community Method' to New 
Modes of Governance' (2011) 63 Current Legal Problems 179-214. 
13 A Steinbach, Economic Policy Coordination in the Euro Area (Routledge 2014) 72-171; 
KA Armstrong, 'The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline' (2013) 38 EL Rev. 
601; A Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (OUP 2015) 15; 
MW Bauer and S Becker, 'The Unexpected Winner of the Crisis: The European 
Commission's Strengthened Role in Economic Governance' (2014) 36 Journal of 
European Integration 213-222; G Majone, Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis 
(CUP 2014) 199, 308; D Chalmers, 'The European Redistributive State and a 
European Law of Struggle' (2012) 18 European Law Journal 676-682; A Scott, 'Does 
Economic Union Require a Fiscal Union?' in LW Shuibhne and NN Gormley (eds), 
From Single Market to Economic Union (OUP 2012) 40-50. 
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Thus, this article seeks to offer insight into the coordination instruments 
both de lege lata (Stability and Growth Pact) and de lege ferenda (contractual 
agreements). By tying the legal analysis to the policy issue of an insufficient 
level of structural reforms, we explore incentive-based mechanisms that 
promote the implementation of structural reforms in EU Member States. 
Incentive-based mechanisms refer to both the established sanction-based 
logic of the existing surveillance mechanisms as well as to reward-based 
instruments offering benefits to Member States for implementing structural 
reforms. While the sanction-based logic is enshrined in SGP and MIP, 
contractual agreements rather follow a reward-based approach. 
 
The article is structured as follows: Section II identifies the flexibility within 
the existing fiscal surveillance system, with a particular view towards 
promoting structural reforms. In particular, relevant norms of the SGP and 
MIP are interpreted and contrasted with the Commission's more recent 
enforcement practice. Section III examines reward-based coordination 
discussing nature and scope of contractual agreements between the EU and 
Member States or between Member States providing a 'quid pro quo' of 
structural reforms and financial support. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. SANCTION-BASED PROMOTION OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS UNDER 
THE SGP 
 
The SGP remains the key instrument of fiscal policy coordination, featuring 
binding rules and sanction mechanisms.14 In the past, application of the SGP 
focused on fiscal policy and compliance with numerical budget rules. This 
narrow focus has been subject to criticism pointing, inter alia, at other 
elements promoting growth and positive long-term budgetary effects, such 
as structural reforms. The Commission has identified structural reforms as 
key elements of the EU's economic policy strategy for growth.15 In line with 
the overall trend towards broadening the surveillance focus from a purely 
                                                 
14 For an interpretation of the SGP as a tool to avoid free-riding, see Steinbach, 
Economic Policy (fn 13) 28; P De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (10th edn, OUP 
2014) 218-224. 
15 European Commission, 'Annual Growth Survey 2015' (Communication) COM 
(2014) 902. 
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fiscal to a more macroeconomic perspective, incentive-based tools can be 
extended towards promoting structural reforms. 
Under the preventive arm of the SGP, the so-called structural reform clause 
provides the legal basis for introducing the implementation of structural 
reforms under the fiscal surveillance regime. According to Article 5 of 
Regulation No. 1466/97, the Commission and Council shall 'take into 
account the implementation of major structural reforms' when defining the 
adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective. Major structural 
reforms may, under specific circumstances, justify a temporary deviation 
from the MTO of the concerned Member State or from the adjustment path 
towards it. Thus, under the preventive arm, there is an explicit reference 
allowing the linking of the fiscal regime under the SGP to a broader 
macroeconomic dimension of structural reforms.16  
 
1. Connecting Coordination Mechanisms 
In this vein, the explicit reference to structural reforms in Article 5 (which 
had been incorporated into the Regulation already in 2005) may serve as the 
basis to connect various economic policy coordination tools to each other. 
Structural reforms are typically dealt with in the country-specific 
recommendations of the European Semester. These recommendations are 
issued in May of each year and provide country-specific policy advice to 
Member States in areas deemed as priorities for the next 12-18 months.17 
 
The implementation of structural reforms identified in the country-specific 
reforms within the European Semester into the SGP through Article 5 of 
Regulation No. 1466/97 sets up a comprehensive coordination mechanism 
that expands the fiscal policy focus of the SGP. It creates a link between the 
implementation of Europe 2020's aims and the fiscal policy requirements of 
the SGP, interweaving economic and social policy recommendations with 
fiscal policy commitments. The recommendations typically address a variety 
of subjects, including public finances, tax policy issues, and labour market 
                                                 
16 Regarding the evolutionary process towards linking the purely fiscal focus of EU 
surveillance to a more comprehensive macroeconomic regime, see Steinbach, 
Economic Policy (fn 13) 103-130. 
17 For a detailed analysis of the European Semester, see Armstrong, 'The New 
Governance' (fn 13) 601. 
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questions. Through the European Semester, the EU is no longer restricted to 
issuing economic and fiscal policy aims. It now also advises national 
governments on specific measures to reach these aims. We thus see a clear 
effort to consolidate, synchronize and expand existing forms of 
coordination.18 The avowed aim is to stop fiscal and economic policy isolation 
and align policies with each other. 
  
Importantly, through the structural reform clause, the recommendations 
under the European Semester are upgraded in terms of their binding nature. 
Usually, country-specific recommendations are non-binding; the only way 
the Commission typically can force states to adhere to its recommendations 
is through peer pressure, i.e., 'naming and shaming'.19 However, once the 
country-specific recommendations are channelled through the structural 
reform clause, they factually gain binding nature as they are tied to the 
enforcement of fiscal rules. 
 
2. Structural Reforms Under the SGP 
A. Preventive Arm 
In its Communication, the Commission has set out a number of principles to 
be followed for the structural reforms clause to be activated.20 First, reforms 
must be major in terms of their effect on growth and the sustainability of 
public finances. Requiring a significant impact enables the Commission to 
request sizeable and effective reforms and an appropriate choice of policy 
mix. Second, reforms must have a long-term positive budgetary effect where 
this effect can correspond to direct budgetary savings from reforms (e.g., 
pension reform) or through increased revenues (e.g., as a result of an increased 
labour force). Third, and most controversial, is that the wording of Article 5 
of Regulation No. 1466/97 requires the 'implementation' of structural 
reforms. As pointed out by the Council Legal Service, the Commission's 
approach is rather ambiguous on this point.21 While the Commission requires 
                                                 
18 Steinbach, Economic Policy (fn 13) 173-176. 
19 Steinbach, Economic Policy (fn 13) 126. 
20 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 11. 
21 Council of the European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 April 
2015), para. 21. 
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'full implementation' of the reform, it acknowledges that adopted reforms 
may take time and thus views the implementation of reforms as fulfilled when 
'the Member State presents a medium-term structural reform plan'. By 
contrast, the Council refers to the Code of Conduct, according to which the 
'implementation' pursuant to Article 5 requires that 'only adopted reforms 
should be considered'.22  
 
a. Interpreting and Applying the Term 'Implementation' of Structural Reforms 
The question at stake is what status of implementation is required, that is, 
whether these reforms have to be formally adopted under domestic laws, 
giving them binding force,23 or whether a detailed structural reform plan is 
sufficient.24 From a legal perspective, given that interpretation of the term 
'implementation' is at stake, recourse should be taken to conventional modes 
of legal interpretation. Reference to the literal meaning25 produces 
ambiguous results as shown in the controversial perceptions between 
Commission and Council.26 Implementation clearly is a stepwise approach 
that ranges from initial internal decision-making among policy-makers up to 
the actual entering into force of a specific measure. A restrictive reading 
would imply the completion of the entire implementation process, which, 
however, would render the clause impractical given the lengthy 
implementation process. 
 
                                                 
22 ibid para. 23. 
23 ibid para. 23. 
24 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 11.  
25 On this mode of interpretation see only Case 30/59, ECLI:EU:C:1961:2, 
Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v ECSC High Authority, 49; Case 207/81, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:281, Felicitas v Finanzamt; see also the Court's literal and systematic 
approach to interpreting Article 125 TFEU, see V Borger, 'The ESM and the 
European Court's Predicament in Pringle' (2013) 14 German Law Journal 113, 117. 
26 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 10; Council of the 
European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 April 2015), para. 23; 
European Union, 'Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (Code of Conduct)' (3 September 2012) 5. 
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Looking from a contextual perspective27, however, guidance on 
interpretation may be sought from practice under the financial support 
programmes of the EU. The pattern of conditionality and disbursement of 
payment offers an understanding that the favourable treatment (under EU 
financial assistance, the disbursement of loans) is typically granted on the 
basis of formalized commitments and their forward-looking 
implementation. Under the support programmes for Greece, for instance, 
before each disbursement, a joint mission of Commission, ECB and IMF 
staff frequently monitors compliance with the conditions of the 
conditionality programme. More specifically, disbursements of respective 
tranches are linked to the implementation of milestones agreed between 
Greece and the troika institutions. Disbursements are tied to forward-
looking commitments, including steps to implement these reforms fully 
through secondary legislation, other administrative acts and complementary 
reforms.28 It becomes clear that the practice of requiring implementation of 
reforms as prerequisite for a disbursement is an institutionalized alternation 
of 'quid pro quo' on a forward-looking basis. Through the splitting of the 
financial support into disbursements, the milestones towards 
implementation can be coupled to respective disbursements. 
  
Applying this functionality to the exchange of structural reforms in return for 
favourable treatment under Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, one can infer 
that, in general, a forward-looking commitment should suffice. This implies 
that implementation in terms of a credible, comprehensive and detailed plan 
should be sufficient. However, given that the split into disbursements 
provides an effective tool to review and control the actual implementation 
(that is, transformation of structural reforms into legislative acts), the 
question is whether a similar implementation control can be operationalized 
                                                 
27 The Court takes account of the meaning of a provision in light of scheme and 
context, Case 149/77, ECLI:EU:C:1978:130, Defrenne v SABENA, Case 87/75, 
ECLI:EU:C:1976:18, Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze. The Court 
also applies interpretation methods cumulatively, see more recently Case C-399/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal. 
28 Report on Greece's compliance with the milestones for the disbursement to the 
Hellenic Republic of the third tranche of EUR 1.0bn of the EFSF instalment related 
to the fourth review under the second programme, 11 August 2014. 
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with regard to Article 5 of Regulation No- 1466/97. Indeed, the metric of 
Article 5 provides such implementation control in case of a Member State's 
failure to implement the agreed reform. In such a case, the temporary 
deviation from the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective (MTO) will no 
longer be considered as warranted.29 On the basis of Article 6(2) and Article 
10(2) of Regulation No. 1466/97, the Commission can issue a warning to the 
Member State and ultimately propose to the Council a recommendation to 
request that Member States take appropriate policy measures. In case of 
continued failure to implement the structural reform, euro area Member 
States may ultimately be requested to lodge an interest-bearing deposit.30 
The existing sanction-based instruments allow an interpretation of the term 
'implementation' under Article 5 based on an alternation of ex-ante 
assessment and ex-post control.  
 
This finding is also in line with an interpretation focusing on the purpose and 
spirit of the provision.31 Its aim is to provide temporary fiscal relief in return 
for the implementation of measures that actually have a long-term positive 
budgetary effect. This aim can be sufficiently safeguarded through the 
control mechanism described above, which allows a return to the initial 
MTO and imposes sanctions in case of implementation failure. In sum, the 
deviation from the MTO is warranted based on credible reform 
commitments, the implementation of which is sufficiently incentivized by 
the threat of modification of the favourable MTO path. 
 
b. Streamlining Coordination Mechanisms 
In terms of consistency between the various economic policy coordination 
instruments, the choice of structural reforms under Article 5 should be 
streamlined with the policy recommendations of other EU economic policy 
instruments. First, the Commission can take recourse to the structural 
                                                 
29 European Commission, 'Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform 
Programme of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability 
Programme of Belgium' COM (2015) 252 final, 12. 
30 Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 1–7. . 
31 On this mode of interpretation see already Case 65/76, ECLI:EU:C:1977:7, Derycke 
34; Case 79/81, ECLI:EU:C:1983:70, Baccini v ONEM 1076. 
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reforms identified in the country-specific recommendations under the 
European Semester, which offer a detailed set of goals and instruments across 
economic and social policy areas. Second, the Commission should streamline 
the application of Article 5 by way of reference to the country-specific 
recommendations issued under its MIP based on Regulation No 1176/2011. 
The scope of the MIP goes beyond fiscal parameters that extend to all 
possible factors related to macroeconomic performance.32 More specifically, 
according to Article 8 of Regulation No 1176/2011, the Council adopts a 
country-specific corrective action plan listing the specific actions required to 
resolve the imbalances. 
  
Given the significant degree of parallel proceedings under SGP and MIP, the 
structural reforms clause under the corrective arm provides the legal basis to 
ensure consistency between the two policy tools. In fact, by June 2015, seven 
Member States were involved in parallel proceedings under the EDP and the 
MIP, demonstrating the practical relevance of applying both economic 
policy regimes consistently.33 Also, 16 out of 27 Member States were subject 
to the MIP and thus had received country-specific recommendations under 
this procedure. The structural reform agenda spelled out in detail under the 
MIP34 should thus be the natural reference point for the structural reform 
clause under the SGP. 
                                                 
32 Steinbach, Economic Policy (fn 13) 103-122; M Buti and N Carnot, 'The EMU Debt 
Crisis: Early Lessons and Reforms' (2012) 50 JCMS 899-911; D Gros, 
'Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Symptom or cause of the crisis?' 
(2012) CEPS Policy brief, 266 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.seem?abstract_id=2060118> accessed 7 
February 2016. 
33 Croatia, France, Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
34 For example, Belgium has to 'improve the functioning of the labour market by 
reducing financial disincentives to work, increasing labour market access for specific 
target groups and addressing skills shortages and mismatches' (European 
Commission, 'Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform Programme 
of Belgium and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of 
Belgium' COM (2015) 252 final, 6). And France has to 'remove the restrictions on 
access to and the exercise of regulated professions, beyond the legal professions, in 
particular as regards the health professions as from 2015', European Commission, 
'Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform Programme of France and 
2016} Structural Reforms in EU Member States 186 
 
 
B. Corrective Arm 
While there is an explicit reference to structural reforms under the 
preventive arm in Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, the relevant norms of 
the corrective arm are silent on the treatment of structural reforms. The only 
legal term potentially allowing the incorporation of structural reforms into 
the assessment under the corrective arm is laid down in Article 2 of 
Regulation No. 1467/97, which states that the Commission '[…] shall take 
into account all relevant factors […] in so far as they significantly affect the 
assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member 
State concerned'. The reference to 'relevant factors' has been interpreted by 
the Commission as including the implementation of structural reforms set 
out in the European Semester.35  
 
Given the vagueness of this provision, the question is whether this 
interpretation remains within the boundaries of the legal text. A number of 
aspects can be put forward in the affirmative: First, the Commission enjoys 
wide leeway of discretion in the application of EU rules. On various 
occasions, the Court has confirmed that the Commission enjoys wide 
discretion in the assessment of economic circumstances.36 Second, there is 
no indication that interpreting structural reforms as 'relevant factors' would 
be incompatible with the overall purpose of the excessive deficit procedure. 
The main purpose of the excessive deficit procedure is to ensure the prompt 
correction of excessive deficits, i.e., making sure that Member States return 
to a sustainable fiscal position. Structural reforms would have to further this 
goal. The Commission37 and other EU institutions38 have repeatedly 
                                                 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of France' COM (2015) 
260 final, 7. 
35 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 13. 
36 See Case T-201/04, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, Microsoft v Commission, para. 87; Case T-
168/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:265, GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission, para. 57. 
37 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 5.  
38 J-C Juncker, 'Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union' (2015) Five 
Presidents' Report <https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/5-
presidents-report_en.pdf> accessed 7 February 2016, 7. 
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underscored the relevance of structural reforms as an essential element for 
long-term positive budgetary development. Structural reforms are a requisite 
for growth as the basis for fiscal sustainability. The positive correlation 
between structural reforms and positive budgetary effects is also 
acknowledged in Article 5 of Regulation No. 1466/97, which explicitly refers 
to structural reforms that have such a positive budgetary effect. Third, and in 
the same vein, for the sake of consistency between the preventive and 
corrective arm of the SGP, the same reasoning and logic should be applied 
given that both arms share the overriding fiscal policy goals. 
 
Consequently, structural reforms could likely be integrated into the excessive 
deficit procedure under the same conditions as discussed above for the 
preventive arm, that is, they must be major, have a long-term positive 
budgetary effect and be implemented within the meaning discussed above. 
The peculiar design allows the Commission to account for structural reforms 
on two stages of the excessive deficit procedure. First, when assessing 
whether an excessive deficit procedure needs to be launched, the 
Commission may examine all 'relevant factors' concerning the economic, 
budgetary and debt positions.39 The Commission may consider structural 
reforms as mitigating or aggravating factors that have an effect on its decision 
to open the procedure or not. Second, structural reforms as a relevant factor 
are also considered for determining the deadline for the correction of the 
excessive deficit. Thus, the implementation of major structural reforms 
constitutes a relevant factor that allows for a multiannual path for the 
correction of excessive deficit.40  
 
As under the preventive arm, the review and control of the implementation 
of reforms are ensured through procedural remedies. Failure to implement 
the reform will induce the Commission to consider the Member State's 
conduct insufficient, leading to the opening of the excessive deficit 
procedure or to the shortening of the deadline for the correction of  
the excessive deficit. For Euro area Member States, this means that the 
                                                 
39 European Commission, 'Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing 
Rules of the SGP' (Communication) COM (2015) 12 final, 13.  
40 ibid 13. 
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Commission may recommend to the Council the imposition of a fine.41In 
sum, there is significant leeway to account for the implementation of 
structural reforms both in the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP. A 
comprehensive and detailed structural reform plan containing well-specified 
measures, verifiable information and credible timelines may lead to a 
modification of the medium-term budgetary objective. The requirements 
attached to the degree of implementation should not be too high, given that 
there is sufficient potential for sanctions and withdrawal of the favourable 
treatment. Similarly, under the EDP, structural reforms may be a relevant 
factor when decisions are made about opening procedures and setting the 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit. Incorporation of country-
specific recommendations under the European Semester, as well as the 
corrective action plan under the MIP, ensures consistency of the economic 
policy tools.  
 
3. Investments and the Structural Reform Clause 
The discussion on implementing structural reforms in Member States is 
often tied to Member States' policy space to promote investments. 
Politically, the connection is valid given that structural reforms often imply 
fiscal retraction in the short term, triggering a discussion on using 
investments as a measure to counter such short-term effects and lay the 
ground for long-term growth. The EU Commission has addressed such 
concerns by explicitly linking structural reforms with investments.42 
 
The Commission considers that some investments may be deemed to be 
equivalent to major structural reforms within the meaning of the structural 
reforms and may, under certain conditions, justify a temporary deviation 
from the Medium-Term Budgetary Objective of the concerned Member 
State or from the adjustment path towards it. More specifically, a Member 
State will benefit under five conditions: i) if its GDP growth is negative or if 
the GDP remains well below its potential; ii) if the deviation from the MTO 
does not lead to a deficit above the reference value of 3%; iii) if the deviation 
is linked to national expenditure on a project co-funded by the EU under one 
                                                 
41 Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011. 
42 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
Within the Existing Rules of the SGP' COM (2015) 12 final, 8. 
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of its various funds; iv) if the co-financed expenditure does not substitute for 
nationally financed investments, so that total public investments are not 
reduced; and v) if the Member State compensates for any temporary 
deviations. The (economic) purpose of this extension of the structural reform 
clause is to allow Member States to benefit from this clause when their own 
growth is negative and better reflect the country-specific economic 
situation.43 In this vein, the Commission's decision is economically founded 
on those studies that find an over-proportionate decline of public 
investments during phases of budgetary consolidations.44 
 
However, the Commission's assimilation of 'public investments' and 
'structural reforms' is questionable. Apart from the obvious literal difference 
between the two terms, the Commission's own use of the concepts 
'investments' and 'structural reforms' suggests that these terms cannot be 
used interchangeably as legal terms. In its 2015 Annual Report, for instance, 
the Commission refers to its well-established economic policy strategy 
resting on three pillars comprising investments, structural reforms and fiscal 
responsibility.45 According to that economic policy strategy, investments and 
structural reforms constitute individual pillars of the EU economic policy 
and rest on different concepts, though sharing the common goal of 
promoting sustainable growth. More specifically, structural reforms relate to 
reallocating resources efficiently, for example by reducing barriers to the 
reallocation of capital and labour across firms, thus helping to ensure that the 
most productive firms can achieve their growth potential and the less 
efficient ones are restructured or leave the industry.46 By contrast, through 
investments in macroeconomic terms, the public sector increases and 
improves the stock of capital employed in the production of the goods and 
                                                 
43 European Commission, 'Communication, Making the Best Use of the Flexibility 
Within the Existing Rules of the SGP' COM (2015) 12 final, 8-9. 
44 A Turrini, 'Public investment and the EU fiscal framework, European Commission' 
(2004) Economic Papers No 202, 4. 
45 European Commission, 'Annual Growth Survey 2015' (Communication) COM 
(2014) 902, 5. 
46 E Canton and others, 'The Role of Structural Reform for Adjustment and Growth' 
(June 2014) ECFIN Economic Brief 34, 1-2. 
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services they provide.47 'Public investments' and 'structural reforms' refer to 
distinct concepts both in relation to the use of these terms in the EU legal 
framework as well as with regard to the general meaning of these terms. 
 
Undisputedly, even though public investments and structural reforms are 
conceptually different, there may be cases of coincidence. For example, 
reforms in the education sector may well go hand in hand with additional 
investment spending in this area. In such a case, it may be artificial to 
disentangle structural reforms and public investments, given that both are 
tied to each other and contribute to improving the adjustment capacity of an 
economy. However, the Commission broadly assimilates investments and 
structural reforms and limits eligible investments to projects co-funded by 
the EU funds which have positive budgetary effect within Article 5 of 
Regulation No. 1466/97.48 This approach raises concerns on three grounds: 
First, and considering the distinct concept of investment and structural 
reforms, there is no ground for a general assumption that all co-financing 
expenditures by Member States amount to structural reforms.49 Rather, a 
case-by-case analysis that examines to which investments the 
implementation of structural reforms is intrinsically tied should be made 
before investments qualify as structural reforms within the meaning of 
Article 5(1) of Regulation No. 1466/97. It may be comprehensible from the 
Commission's perspective to avoid a burdensome and disputable assessment 
of specific investments as to their quality as structural reform, but a general 
assimilation of investments and structural reforms would not account for the 
conceptual differences between these terms. 
 
Second, and related to the analysis above, there is the issue of discrimination. 
In fact, the Commission discriminates against domestic public investments. 
The Commission gives privilege to any expenditure that is co-funded by the 
EU for the assessment of 'structural reforms' pursuant to Article 5 of 
                                                 
47 A Turrini, 'Public investment and the EU fiscal framework, European Commission' 
(2004) Economic Papers No 202, 6. 
48 European Commission, 'Annual Growth Survey 2015' (Communication) COM 
(2014) 902, 8. 
49 Council of the European Union, 'Opinion of the Legal Service', Ref 7739/15 (7 April 
2015), para. 19. 
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Regulation No. 1466/97. This is an open discrimination against national 
public investments that might equally be linked to structural reforms. Such 
discrimination ignores the fact that economic policy-making remains within 
the competence of the Member States. In principle, Member States retain 
competence for economic policy (Article 4(1), 5(2) TEU). Instead, the EU's 
competence lies in coordination of the policies, that is in arranging 
coordination of policies that remain national in nature.50 Member States can 
adopt measures in this field, as long as the competences of the Union are not 
infringed.51 The conduct of economic policy inherently enshrines the right to 
identify and implement investment and structural reform priorities 
according to a Member State's preference, and in observance of the country-
specific state of the economy. The freedom to exercise economic policy as a 
genuine domain of Member States may be restricted if the EU choices of 
economic policies override national choices. Under the MIP, such measures 
can be a part of the action plan.52 By contrast, the granting of privileges – 
under the fiscal surveillance of the EU – to economic policy projects 
identified by the EU through the activities of its funds (while domestic 
investment projects enjoy a less favourable treatment), generates conflicts 
with Member States freedom in conducting economic policies. 
 
Third, from the perspective of effectively implementing the legal fiscal 
framework and given the overall intention of the fiscal surveillance in 
ensuring sustainable fiscal conduct, there is no indication why investments 
co-funded by the EU should rather qualify as a structural reform than 
domestic investment projects. There is neither a general legal rule nor an 
economic rationale according to which projects promoted by EU funds 
would be considered fundamentally different from domestic projects, except 
for the fact that the latter typically imply larger cross-border spillover effects. 
                                                 
50 Hinarejos (fn 13) 73; D Chalmers and others, European Union Law (2nd ed., CUP 2010) 
210; B de Witte and T Beukers, 'The Court of Justice approves the creation of the 
European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle' (2013) 50 CML 
Rev. 805, 832. 
51 R Palmstorfer, 'To Bail Out or Not to Bail Out? The Current Framework of 
Financial Assistance for Euro Area Member States Measured against the 
Requirements of EU Primary Law' (2012) 37 EL Rev. 771, 773. 
52 Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances. 
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For example, projects co-funded under the Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF) do not primarily promote projects amounting to structural reforms 
more than domestic projects would do. The CEF finances projects that fill 
the missing links in Europe's energy, transport and digital infrastructure.53 
Even though this infrastructure may promote the completion of the internal 
market, there is no indication that a national infrastructure project would not 
serve similar goals or contribute otherwise to structural reforms in terms of 
reallocating resources more efficiently. 
 
In sum, an extensive interpretation of the term 'public investment' as a 
structural reform within the meaning of Article 5 of Regulation No. 1367/97 
seems to overstretch the literal and contextual meaning of this provision. 
However, the Commission's general tendency to promote investments 
within the boundaries of the fiscal rules may be compatible with the relevant 
provision under two conditions. First, a case-by-case examination of the 
investments at stake must give consideration to whether a project is linked to 
the implementation of structural reforms rather than generally equating 
public investments and structural reforms. Second, the general privilege of 
projects co-funded by EU funds over national investment projects appears to 
be untenable in light of the wording and purpose of the rules. Domestic 
investments should generally be treated like EU projects when considering 
their quality as structural reforms for the application of Article 5 of 
Regulation No. 1466/97. Practical inconveniences seem inevitable: While 
there are no legal or economic grounds for discrimination, one must concede 
that considering all public investments as potentially qualifying as structural 
reforms would imply an additional burden of examination on the 
Commission's side. 
 
III. CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS PROMOTING STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS 
 
The current surveillance system under the SGP operates in a hierarchical 
manner, that is, the EU Commission leads the procedure and has the right to 
                                                 
53 Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, 
amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulations (EC) 
no. 680/2007 and (EC) no. 67/2010, OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 129–171. 
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decide authoritatively on the structural reforms that are to be implemented. 
Also, the SGP incentivizes through sanctions rather than rewards, as 
monetary or procedural penalties can be imposed in case of non-compliance 
of a Member State.54 That would be fundamentally different if structural 
reforms were incentivized and incorporated by contractual agreements. Such 
agreements would modify the existing logic, as structural reforms would be 
negotiated between the parties and incentives would be set through 
rewarding the implementation of structural reforms. One can conceptualize 
such agreements in two ways: First, through agreements concluded between 
the EU and individual Member States, underpinned by financial support as 
an incentive. Second, as mutual agreements concluded between Member 
States, which agree on the implementation of structural reforms in the 
respective country as a kind of barter trading. 
 
The EU Commission had proposed the Convergence and Competitiveness 
Instrument (CCI) encompassing contractual arrangements to be agreed 
between a Member State and the Commission underpinned by financial 
support.55 In principle, participation is voluntary and Member States would 
need to present an action plan similar to that required under the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure of the MIP.56 The arrangements would be based on the 
                                                 
54 The sanction-based application of the SGP thus remains within in the 'surveillance 
model' of EU coordination, in which the EU is the 'discipline enforcer', applying 
numerical fiscal rules and the existing budgetary and economic surveillance system, 
see Hinarejos (fn 13) 181; T Börzel, 'European Governance: Negotiation and 
Competition in the Shadow of Hierarchy' (2010) 48 JCMS 191; A De Streel, 'EU 
Fiscal Governance and the Effectiveness of its Reform' in M Adams and others (eds), 
The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 85, 
87. 
55 See the two Communications: European Commission, 'Towards a deep an genuine 
EMU: the introduction of a Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument' 
(Communication) COM (2013) 165 final; and European Commission, 'Towards a 
deep and genuine EMU: Ex ante coordination of plans for major economic policy 
reforms' (Communication) COM (2013) 166 final. The contractual arrangements 
were mentioned already in European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and 
genuine economic and monetary union Launching a European Debate' 
(Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2. 
56 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2, 21; 
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country-specific recommendations adopted under the MIP.57 The 
accompanying financial support would only be granted for reforms that 
create positive spillovers across Member States and thus promote the 
functioning of EMU. Financial support should be designed to support the 
financing of difficult reforms. In case of non-compliance with the contract, 
the financial support can be withheld.58  
 
In view of the existing coordination instruments, the main function of 
contractual agreements is to add a reward-based enforcement mechanism of 
country-specific recommendations on a voluntary basis and sidelining the 
sanctions-based systems as foreseen by the SGP and MIP. Its scope of 
application is naturally greater, as the choice of structural reforms is wider 
and the point in time of their implementation is unrestricted, whilst the SGP 
allows for sanctions if certain fiscal parameters are fulfilled. Thus, in practice 
the added-value of contractual agreements could be seen as an instrument 
fostering structural reforms during 'good times' when proceedings under 
SGP and MIP have not been triggered yet. This would also help to maintain 
structural reform efforts when political-economy mechanisms would rather 
lower the efforts to undertake structural reforms. This is further supported 
by the greater ownership that voluntary commitments would have compared 
to the policy recommendations under the European Semester, which are 
typically seen by national policy-makers as undesirable interventions of the 
EU into the national policy space. 
 
                                                 
see also KA Armstrong, 'Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping 
of Dominium-Law' in M Adams and others (eds), The Constitutionalization of European 
Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 65, 77. 
57 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2, 21. 
58 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2, 22; 
for an economic consideration, see HP Grüner, 'The Political Economy of Structural 
Reform and Fiscal Consolidation Revisited' (2013) Economic Papers 487 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ecp
487_en.pdf> accessed 7 February 2016, 37. 
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1. Contractual Agreements Between the EU and Member States 
Assessing the legal feasibility of contractual agreements raises questions 
regarding the legal nature of contractual agreements and the possible legal 
basis to allow for such agreements sidelined by a funding facility. 
 
A. Legal Nature of Contractual Agreements 
The EU treaties are silent on contractual agreements between the EU and its 
Member States. In the absence of an explicit legal basis under primary or 
secondary law, which would provide for a certain competence of the EU vis-
à-vis the Member States, general considerations apply in principle as to the 
EU's ability to enter contractual relationships. One may consider such 
agreements as constituting international law treaties or, based on specific 
secondary law, as Memoranda of Understanding. 
 
In general, the EU can enter into international agreements according to 
Article 47 TEU and Article 335 TFEU. In addition, Article 216 TFEU 
explicitly recognizes the EU's possibility to conclude agreements with third 
countries and international organizations. The ability to enter into 
agreements with EU Member States is implicitly acknowledged by Article 50 
(2) TEU, according to which the EU concludes an agreement with a Member 
State leaving the EU.59 Also, any agreement between the EU and a Member 
State must remain within the substantial competences granted to the EU 
under the treaties.60 The principle of conferral in Article 5 TEU would be 
violated if the EU were to conclude an agreement outside of the scope of the 
legal basis of the EU treaties.  
 
Considering the scope of EU contractual external action determined by the 
EU treaty, it is hard to see how a contractual agreement between the EU and 
its Member States could be set up as an international treaty, since the 
competences of EU and Member States to act on a specific field are mutually 
exclusive. Whoever holds exclusive competence is solely competent to 
                                                 
59 For a different view, see European Parliament, Legal options for an additional EMU 
fiscal capacity (2013) 20, which argues that this would undermine the legislative 
procedure foreseen by the EU Treaties.  
60 See also the 24th Declaration concerning the legal personality of the European 
Union. 
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conclude agreements and, in the field of shared competence, Member States 
lose their competence to the extent that the Union has exercised its 
competence (Article 2 (2) TFEU). In case of contractual agreements 
foreseeing structural reforms in Member States, the EU may be competent 
based on Article 136 TFEU or Article 173 TFEU. Agreements promoting the 
implementation of structural reforms generally appear connected to Article 
136 TFEU as a regular norm providing for economic policy coordination. In 
the past, Article 136 TFEU has been the core legal basis for extending 
budgetary surveillance and economic coordination,61 giving rise to concerns 
about an inadmissible stretching of the boundaries of this norm.62 According 
to the Commission, the contractual agreements could be part of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and based on Article 136 TFEU.63 
However, given that this norm is potentially in conflict with the genuine 
Member States' competence to conduct economic policy, coordination 
competences granted to the EU in this area should be interpreted 
restrictively.64 In relation to the coordination competences under Article 136 
TFEU, this means that they must remain within the scope of the relevant 
provisions (Article 121 and 126 TFEU).65 Article 121 (3) and (4) TFEU 
established a peculiar system of macroeconomic monitoring by setting up the 
authoritative surveillance competence of the EU institutions. More 
specifically, Article 8 (1) of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
foresees that the EU Commission and the Member States develop national 
reform programmes that – unlike the contractual agreements – can be made 
binding as corrective action plans by the Council.66 Considering the MIP's 
                                                 
61 Hinarejos (fn 13) 33. 
62 K Tuori and K Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (CUP 2014) 
168-171. 
63 European Commission, 'A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary 
union Launching a European Debate' (Communication) COM (2012) 777 final/2. 
64 J Jäger and E Springle, Asymmetric Crisis in Europe and Possible Futures (Taylor & 
Francis Ltd 2015); U Häde in C Calliess and M Ruffert (eds), EUV/AUEV-Kommentar 
(4th edn, C.H. Beck 2011) Art. 136 TFEU, para. 4. 
65 J-V Louis, 'The Economic and Monetary Union' (2004) 41 CML Rev. 575; U Häde, 
'Art. 136 AEUV - eine neue Generalklausel für die Wirtschafts- und 
Währungsunion?' [2011] JZ 333; B Kempen in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV-
Kommentar (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2012) Art. 126 AEUV, para. 2. 
66 Article 8(2) of Regulation 1176/2011. 
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focus on removing macroeconomic imbalances through structural reforms, 
there is a significant conceptual similarity with the measures envisaged to 
form part of contractual agreements, for which the EU Commission and the 
respective Member State consensually negotiate the reforms to be 
incorporated into the agreement. Since contractual agreements are less 
authoritative due to their consensual nature, they should be deemed 
compatible with the more intrusive competence granted to the Commission 
under Article 121 TFEU.67 Member States enter contractual agreements on a 
voluntary basis securing their policy space and the choice of structural 
reforms, their general competence in dealing with economic policy issues is 
acknowledged, and their position is not worsened in case of non-compliance 
with the contractual agreement (apart from losing the support under the 
financial incentive scheme).68 Most importantly, structural reforms agreed 
upon under contractual agreements are intended to ensure conformity with 
the broad guidelines referred to in Article 121 (4) TFEU,69 and they reduce 
the risk of the proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union 
being jeopardized, which indicates a parallel between the structural reforms 
under the MIP and the contractual agreements.70 If the EU can conclude 
agreements in line with the principle of conferral and to the extent that it 
enjoys internal competence, Member States cannot longer conclude 
agreements in this area.71  
  
Alternatively, the contractual relationship may be established as a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). While the EU treaties are silent on 
                                                 
67 However, one may ask whether there is a need for an additional legal obligation 
under a contractual agreement, as Member States under the MIP are bound by the 
specific measures adopted under this procedure, European Parliament (fn 59) 21. The 
added value of the contractual agreements may then only be the incentivizing of 
funding (reward-based incentives).  
68 ibid 22. 
69 For a background on the guidelines and their effect, see D Hodson, Governing the 
Euro Area Good Times and Bad (OUP 2011) chapter 5. 
70 See also European Parliament (fn 59) 22. 
71 This is different in the case of 'mixed agreements' that are concluded by both the EU 
and the Member States with third countries. See A Steinbach, 'Kompetenzkonflikte 
bei der Änderung gemischter Abkommen durch die EG und ihre Mitgliedstaaten' 
(2007) 18 EuZW 109-112. 
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this instrument, it has been used frequently during the crisis, rendering 
financial assistance to states conditional on a number of structural reforms.72 
More formally, MoUs have even become an integral part of Article 13(3) ESM 
Treaty as the instrument detailing the conditionality attached to the 
financial assistance facility.73 There is some conceptual similarity between 
the MoUs under the ESM and the contractual agreement discussed here – 
both tie financial support to conditionality and largely concern the 
implementation of structural reforms. Incentives towards compliance with 
contractual agreements can then be set by financial assistance that is granted 
only if there is compliance, and withheld in case of non-compliance. Similar 
to the approach chosen under the ESM Treaty, one could adopt secondary 
legislation allowing for the conclusion of contractual agreements. However, 
the MoUs under the ESM Treaty were concluded under an international 
agreement outside of the EU legal framework. By contrast, if MoUs 
foreseeing contractual agreements were set up under EU secondary law 
within EU competence and being adopted by the EU Commission, they 
would become an integral part of the EU legal order. As such, compatibility 
with other EU legislation and in particular with the fiscal and 
macroeconomic regime under the SGP and the MIP would have to be 
ensured – this would be facilitated by the fact that the EU Commission would 
be the leading institutions both in governing the ordinary fiscal regime and 
the conceptual agreements. 
 
                                                 
72 Armstrong, 'The New Governance' (fn 13) 602. See also Hinarejos (fn 13) 131; C 
Kilpatrick, 'Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not 
EU Law?' (2014) 10 EuConst 393, 411. 
73 Similarly, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was established 
on the basis of an Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 establishing a European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 1–4.. Loans and credit lines 
offered under this regulation are adopted by 'implementing decisions' of the Council 
under conditions to be determined by the Commission and contained in MoUs. See 
Council Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU on granting Union financial assistance 
to Ireland (as amended) OJ L 30, 4.2.2011, p. 34–39 ; Council Implementing Decision 
2011/344/EU on granting Union financial assistance to Portugal (as amended OJ L 
159, 17.6.2011, p. 88–92. See Armstrong, 'The New Governance' (fn 13) 606. 
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B. Funding Contractual Agreements 
Without the possibility to conclude contractual agreements through 
international treaties, contractual agreements ought to be established on the 
basis of secondary legislation.74 One may consider three potential legal 
grounds in the EU treaties, which allow for the establishment of funding 
support sidelining contractual agreements. 
 
First, Articles 136 and 121 TFEU may serve as legal basis for a funding scheme 
sidelining contractual agreements that are otherwise in line with these 
provisions. In Pringle, however, the Court found in relation to the ESM that 
'neither Article 122(2) TFEU nor any other provision of the EU and FEU 
Treaties confers a specific power on the Union to establish a permanent 
stability mechanism such as the ESM',75 which raises the question whether 
the fund attached to contractual agreements would be construed as a stability 
mechanism like the ESM. However, this is unlikely given the peculiar 
function of the ESM, as 'the ESM is not concerned with the coordination of 
the economic policies of the Member States, but rather constitutes a 
financing mechanism'.76 Comparison with the ESM thus depends on whether 
contractual agreements are considered as an economic policy coordination 
tool or as a permanent stability mechanism. Connecting country-specific 
policy recommendations to incentivizing payments contains elements of 
both economic policy conduct and financial support. But while under the 
ESM financial support seeks 'to safeguard the financial stability of the euro 
area',77 under contractual agreements financial support aims at the 
implementation of structural reforms in order to promote the economic 
adjustment capacity of a Member State. In sum, in light of the different 
design and intention of the ESM and contractual agreements discussed here 
and given that Article 136 TFEU has been the basis for more intrusive policy 
tools such as the national reform programmes under the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure, which does not require the consent of the country 
                                                 
74 See also PP Craig, 'Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional 
Architecture and Constitutional Implications' in M Adams and others (eds) The 
Constitutionalization of EU Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) 29. 
75 Case C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, Pringle v Government of Ireland para. 105. 
76 ibid., para. 110. 
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concerned, voluntary contractual agreements and financial support should 
remain within the ambit of economic policy coordination under Article 136 
TFEU.  
 
Second, an alternative legal basis that is particularly relevant for the 
establishment for the fund attached to the contractual agreements lies in 
Article 175 (3) TFEU. Under this norm, specific measures serving the goals of 
Article 174 TFEU (promotion of overall harmonious development and 
strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion) can be 
adopted, including the use of the EU funds specified in Article 175 (1) TFEU. 
Article 175 (3) provides the basis to adopt further measures, and the phrase 
'specific actions […] outside the Funds' indicates that this provision could be 
used to establish new financial support instruments.78 Accordingly, the 
European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was set up in response to major 
natural disasters and expressed European solidarity to disaster-stricken 
regions within Europe.79 Also, the European Globalization Adjustment 
Fund, which provides support to people who have lost their jobs as a result of 
major structural changes in world trade patterns due to globalization, had 
been based on this provision.80 The degree of flexibility under this norm is 
further highlighted by the establishment of the European Grouping of 
Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), the objective of which is to facilitate and 
promote cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation between 
its members. The EGTC enjoys the legal capacity accorded to legal entities 
by national law and may be used to implement programmes co-financed by 
the Community or any other cross-border cooperation project with or 
without Community funding.81 Hence, in light of the instruments previously 
used under Article 175 (3), there are opportunities to design and endow the 
fund supporting contractual agreements on this basis, provided contractual 
                                                 
78 A Puttler in R Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV-Kommentar (2nd edn, C.H. Beck 2012) Art. 
175 AEUV, para. 7; B Eggers in E Grabitz and others (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen 
Union: EUV/AEUV (C.H. Beck, March 2011) Art. 175 AEUV, para. 5. 
79 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2012/2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity 
Fund OJ L 313, 14.11.2002, p. 3–8. 
80 Regulation (EC) No. 1927/2006 establishing the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund, OJ L 406, 30.12.2006, p. 1–6 
81 Regulation (EC) 1082/2006 on a European grouping of territorial cooperation 
(EGTC), OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 19–24. 
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agreements aim at strengthening the EU's economic, social and territorial 
cohesion. 
 
Third, and depending on the specific design of the contractual agreements, 
Article 352 TFEU could provide the legal basis for a fund outside of the 
regular EU budget and of an agency entrusted with the implementation.82 
According to the flexibility clause, the EU can take appropriate measures if 
action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
policies defined in the treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the 
treaties. In Pringle, the Court left unanswered the question whether a 
stability mechanism such as the ESM could be based on Article 352 TFEU.83 
In principle, establishing a fund that promotes structural reforms under 
Article 352 TFEU appears to be feasible if the fund is necessary to attain the 
objectives mentioned in Article 3 TEU, notably to attain a 'sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth' and to 
safeguard the 'economic and monetary union whose currency is the Euro'. 
However, actions under the flexibility clause must observe limitations 
imposed by the EU treaties, that is, they must not alter the institutional 
setting established by primary law. For example, Article 153 (4) TFEU must 
be observed – this rule allows the EU to support the Member States' social 
and labour policies, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States. Given that any contractual agreement is intended to 
be in line with the country-specific policy recommendations given under the 
European Semester and the MIP, the policy instruments integrated into 
contractual agreements are likely to be compatible with other treaty 
provisions. However, given the unanimity requirement under Article 352 
TFEU, and as the Court has made clear in the Single European Patent84 case 
                                                 
82 R Repasi, 'Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity' (2013) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/474397/IPOL-
AFCO_NT%282013%29474397_EN.pdf> accessed 7 February 2016, 12; on the 
limitations to use Article 352 TFEU as legal basis, see Hinarejos (fn 13) 107; A Arnull, 
'Left to its Own Devices? Opinion 2/94 and the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
in the European Union' in A Dashwood and C Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC 
External Relations (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 61-78, chapter 5. 
83 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (fn 75), para. 67; see also Adam and 
Mena Parras (fn 11) 852, 859. 
84 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:240, Spain and Italy v Council. 
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(namely that it is possible to make use of legal bases requiring unanimity 
through enhanced cooperation), resorting to enhanced cooperation might be 
the more realistic option, provided the above legal bases should not suffice 
given the specific design of contractual agreements.85  
 
2. Inter se Agreements Between Member States 
A. General Design 
As an alternative to the contractual relationship between the EU and its 
Member States, one may also consider bi- or plurilateral agreements between 
Member States without the involvement of the EU. The interdependence of 
Member States participating in a single currency means that each state has a 
vital stake in all the others following sound economic policies. The crisis has 
shown that a lack of necessary reforms in one Member State can have 
negative effects in others. Conversely, the adoption of structural reforms in 
one country has a positive spillover effect on others – hence, there is a mutual 
interest in implementing structural reforms.86 Contractual agreements 
between Member States respond to this rationale. They are bilateral 
agreements between Member States in which the latter, voluntarily and at 
their own motion, commit to a certain reform or set of binding reforms. 
Reciprocity in the deal would ensure the positive cross-border spillovers from 
the domestic deal and increase the Member States' otherwise lacking 
willingness to reform.  
 
The practical relevance of such agreements is illustrated by the ambitions 
expressed in the joint report from France and Germany on economic reforms 
focusing on competitiveness and investment issues.87 Even though such 
bilateral reform agendas have not been considered binding, they reflect both 
                                                 
85 There are, however, obvious legal and political restrictions associated with actions 
within enhanced cooperation, which cannot be discussed here. See M Schwartz, 'A 
Memorandum of Misunderstanding - The Doomed Road of the European Stability 
Mechanism and a Possible Way Out: Enhanced Cooperation' (2014) 51 CML Rev. 
389-423. 
86 Grüner (fn 58) 30. 
87 Duffy (fn 9) and Enderlein and Pisan-Ferry (fn 10). To date, this initiative has been a 
rather political project without leading to a contractual or otherwise legally relevant 
coordination. 
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design and nature of the CCIs on a bilateral basis and it remains possible that 
bilateral agreements on structural reforms may politically more likely to be 
concluded given the reciprocal character of reforms.  
 
In the past, treaties between Member States related to EU matters were seen 
as possible threat to the EU legal order, especially when they applied to some 
(not all) Member States ('partial agreements') and were formed without 
involving the EU institutions.88 However, Member States resorting to 
international agreements outside the EU legal order is, in itself, nothing 
new.89 Past inter se agreements include arrangements such as the Schengen 
framework90 or the Prüm Convention, in the area of justice and home affairs. 
In these cases, deeper integration was pursued by some, but not all, Member 
States by using an instrument of international law.91 More recently, inter se 
agreements between Member States reflected a general trend of 
intergovernmentalism being prevalent as strategy throughout the Euro 
crisis.92 A significant part of crisis-related measures – particularly related to 
budgetary surveillance system, financial stability measures and bailout 
mechanisms for countries in fiscal distress – has been addressed through 
measures outside the EU legal framework.93 This is done through 
international agreements, as experienced with the treaties establishing the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), both of which are supplementary to EU law measures 
governing the EMU.94 This approach is in line with an intergovernmental 
                                                 
88 S Peers, 'Towards a New Form of EU Law?: The Use of EU Institutions outside the 
EU Legal Framework' (2013) 9 EuConst 37, 40. 
89 F Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes, Consti-
tutional Challenges (OUP 2016) 106. 
90 The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement between 
the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at 
their common borders [2000] OJ L 239/19. 
91 Hinarejos (fn 13) 90. 
92 Fabbrini, 'The Euro-Crisis and the Courts' (fn 4) 110; Hinarejos (fn 13) 111; KA 
Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion. Europeanization through Policy Coordination 
(OUP 2010) 67. 
93 Fabbrini, 'The Euro-Crisis and the Courts' (fn 4) 110. 
94 Peers (fn 89) 39. 
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type of governance focussing on the leeway enjoyed by national governments 
to rely on the flexibility to act outside EU law.95 While crisis management 
outside the EU mechanisms proved effective to offer high flexibility in 
designing tailor-made policy tools, the limits of intergovernmentalism from 
the perspective of legitimacy and consistency have been voiced repeatedly.96 
It remains to be seen what role intergovernmentalism will play in post-crisis 
times over the coming years. 
 
B. Legal Scope 
EU law imposes restrictions on agreements between Member States.97 In 
principle, international treaties involving Member States may be in conflict 
with the Union's competences. Member States concluding an international 
treaty in areas for which the adoption of EU secondary law is possible 
encroach upon the allocation of competences under the EU Treaties. 
Particularly, as far as the respective competence refers to the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the co-decision rights of the European Parliament 
would be infringed.98 The allocation of competences in relation to exclusive 
and shared competences determines the scope of restrictions on Member 
States to conclude international agreements. It is well established that, in 
areas of exclusive EU competence (Articles 2(1), 3(1) TFEU), Member States 
no longer have the right to enter into obligations with third countries.99 
While the Court has explicitly made this restriction in relation to third 
                                                 
95 Fabbrini, 'The Euro-Crisis and the Courts' (fn 4) 110; see also M Messina, 
'Strengthening Economic Governance of the European Union through Enhanced 
Cooperation: A Still Possible, but Already Missed, Opportunity' (2014) 39 EL Rev. 
404; Schwartz (fn 85) 389. 
96 E Chiti and PG Teixeira, 'The constitutional implications of the European responses 
to the financial and public debt crisis' (2013) 50 CML Rev. 683; readers are invited to 
study various disciplinary perspectives in J Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union 
(Polity 2012), D Cohn-Bendit and G Verhofstadt, For Europe (Carl Hanser Verlag 
2012) and S Goulard and M Monti, De la Démocratie en Europe (Flammarion 2013). 
97 See S Hindelang, 'Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU's Judicial 
Monopoly by Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter se 
Treaties? The Case of Intra-EU Investment Arbitration' (2012) 39 Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration 179-206. 
98 European Parliament (fn 59) 20. 
99 Case 22/70, ECLI:EU:C:1971:32, Commision v Council (AETR) 273; Case 804/79, 
ECLI:EU:C:1981:93, Commission v United Kingdom (Sea Fisheries) para. 20. 
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countries only, it must also apply for the relation between Member States.100 
By contrast, in the area of shared competence (Articles 2 (2), 4(2) TFEU), 
Member States are excluded only once the EU exercises its competence.101 
That is, if the EU exercises its internal competence, inter se treaties between 
Member States are no longer admissible.102 
 
Similar considerations apply in areas where the EU performs coordinating 
functions, as the Court spelled out in its Pringle judgment on the 
compatibility of the ESM Treaty with EU law. The Court noted that in areas 
where the European Treaties do not confer a 'specific competence' on the 
EU, Member States are generally free to act.103 In the areas concerned here – 
economic, labour, social policy (Article 2 (3), 5 TFEU) – the Treaty does not 
confer specific competences, as the EU is allowed to act only by coordination. 
More specifically, Member States enjoy full competence in the domain of 
economic and fiscal policy and are thus free to enter into inter se treaties. 
Regarding the prospective content of mutual agreements, general 
restrictions exist in relation to the EU's exclusive competence to conduct 
currency and monetary policy (Article 3 (1) c) TFEU). However, if inter se 
agreements coordinating economic policy have an effect on the stability of 
the euro or the inflation, this would not justify the EU's exclusive 
competence, as 'such an influence would constitute only the indirect 
consequence of the economic policy measures adopted'.104 
 
However, even though Member States continue to enjoy the freedom to 
conclude inter se treaties, they remain bound by the principle of sincere 
cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU, according to which the Union and the 
Member States shall assist each other in carrying out the tasks that arise from 
the treaties. Above all, this principle requires Member States to show 
                                                 
100 R Repasi, 'Völkervertragliche Freiräume für EU-Mitgliedstaaten' [2013] Europa-
recht 45, 52; D Thym, Ungleichzeitigkeit und europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Nomos 
2004) 298-299. 
101 The scope of the limitations has also been clarified in Protocol no. 25 on the exercise 
of shared competence. 
102 See also Adam and Mena Parras (fn 11) 862. 
103 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (fn 75), para. 105. 
104 See Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (fn 75), para. 97. 
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restraint in cases of shared competences, so as not to predetermine potential 
future EU activities.105 This also applies to international agreements among 
Member States.106 In particular, this principle may also restrict Member 
States' freedom regarding the content of mutual agreements that aim to 
implement structural reforms, given that the EU has gained competence in 
specific fields of economic policy, particularly where fiscal policy conduct is 
concerned. The EU budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance system has 
been established on the grounds of Article 121 and 136 TFEU. As discussed 
above, structural reforms covering economic, social and labour policy have 
been incorporated into the European Semester, the SGP and the MIP and 
are developed and decided on by the Commission and the Council. The 
principle of sincere cooperation requires that mutual agreements between 
Member States would be in conformity with the country-specific 
recommendations and adjustment programmes adopted under the EU 
coordination mechanisms. In conclusion, EU Member States are generally 
free to conclude inter se treaties if these concern competences that genuinely 
remain in the domain of the Member States. However, content and design of 
the agreements must take into account the existing legal framework on EU 
coordination, thus safeguarding the functions of EU institutions.107 
 
Member States may also design mutual agreements by way of involving the 
EU, potentially as a broker and monitoring body for the agreement. The EU 
Commission would then facilitate and monitor bilateral agreements, and the 
CJEU may be called upon for judicial review. Guidance on the feasibility of 
such integration of EU institutions into inter se treaties can be sought from 
the Court's Pringle judgment. In that case, the CJEU approved the 
involvement of EU institutions under the intergovernmental ESM Treaty to 
be in line with the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU).108 The 
Court found no infringement of Article 13 TEU by assigning specific tasks to 
                                                 
105 Repasi, 'Völkervertragliche Freiräume' (fn 100) 45, 52;  
106 Palmstorfer (fn 51) 774; Palmstorfer (fn 51) 774; M Ruffert in C Calliess and M Ruffert 
(eds), EUV/AEUV (4th edn, C.H. Beck 2011) Art. 1 AEUV, para. 13. 
107 For a similar debate on the compatibility of the intergovernmental fiscal compact 
with the EU fiscal policy surveillance, see Repasi, 'Völkervertragliche Freiräume' (fn 
100) 70. 
108 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (fn 75), para.152. 
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some EU institutions in areas which do not fall under the exclusive 
competence of the Union, 'provided that those tasks do not alter the essential 
character of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and TFEU 
Treaties.'109 While this finding has been criticized as hampering the 
institutional design of the EU,110 allocating tasks to EU institutions in 
framing inter se agreements remains in line with established CJEU 
jurisprudence. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We currently observe a political-economy climate that gives little indication 
for deepening integration towards a 'fiscal federalism model' – Member 
States will continue to retain competence to conduct economic policy.111 It is 
thus likely that under-provision of structural reforms will remain a perennial 
phenomenon in the EU. The crisis revealed the adverse implications of 
sluggish structural reforms which led to comprehensive reform obligations 
for countries under financial assistance programmes.  
 
Beyond that, there is scope to employ existing and new legal instruments for 
the purpose of advancing structural reforms across the euro zone. By 
exploiting the existing surveillance tools and by introducing new 
arrangements under the current rules, surveillance and policy options are 
diversified, which enables more targeted responses to country-specific 
needs.112 There is significant leeway to account for the implementation of 
                                                 
109 Case C-370/12 Pringle v Government of Ireland (fn 75) para. 158; for a comprehensive 
analysis of the case-law preceding the Pringle judgment, in particular the Court's 
rulings in Bangladesh and Lomé, see Peers (fn 89); see also Hinarejos (fn 13) 126. 
110 PP Craig, 'Pringle and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal Framework: 
Foundations, Procedure and Substance' (2013) 9 EuConst 263. 
111 Armstrong, 'The Character of EU Law' (fn 12) 179; Armstrong, Governing Social 
Inclusion (fn 93). 
112 It is acknowledged that economic governance in the EU is already very multipolar 
and complex, and generates distrust in the efficacy of both domestic and European 
politics. Introducing new instruments might add to this complexity in an undesirable 
way. On the growth of coordination instruments see, inter alia, Steinbach, Economic 
Policy (fn 13); MG Tutty, 'EU Economic Policy Surveillance of Member States' (2013) 
IIEA Economic Governance Paper, <http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/EU%20 
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structural reforms both in the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP. 
Incorporating structural reform agendas developed under the European 
Semester and/or the MIP into the proceedings of the SGP would continue 
the overall trend of applying EU economic surveillance more broadly in a 
macroeconomic sense rather than being limited to fiscal parameters only. 
Thus, the current regime offers some flexibility in incorporating structural 
reforms, even though remaining within the traditional sanction-based logic 
of implementing policy reforms. Given the mixed compliance record, 
alternatives to sanctions should be considered. 
 
In this view, contractual agreements between the EU and Member States or 
among Member States would add a new legal instrument to the arsenal 
fostering structural reforms in the euro zone. Unlike existing instruments, 
contractual agreements allow for more egalitarian and reward-based 
incentives and thus deviate from the classical 'surveillance model' of 
economic governance in the EU.113 Rewards would be set either through 
financial incentives or by reciprocity in the deal if other Member States also 
commit to structural reforms that generate positive spillover effects. 
 
What are the implications for the further trajectory of economic policy 
coordination efforts within the EU? Making use of the described flexibility 
options is likely to be the short-term avenue pursued by the EU institutions. 
In this vein, the Five Presidents' Report has stressed the use of existing 
instruments in implementing structural reforms.114 This may imply a stronger 
role of the European Semester as the forum to assess comprehensively, on a 
country-specific basis, the need for structural reforms, which could then be 
implemented under the MIP and SGP or through arrangements as discussed 
in this analysis. 
 
By contrast, the outlook for the implementation of contractual agreements 
seems far less clear. We should remember that it was the Commission that 
                                                 
Economic%20Policy%20Surveillance%20of%20Member%20States-IIEA%20Eco
nomic%20Governance%20Paper%206%20_Michael%20G%20Tutty.pdf> 
accessed 7 February 2016. 
113 Hinarejos (fn 13) 181; Börzel (fn 54) 191; De Streel (fn 54) 87. 
114 Juncker (fn 38) 8. 
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tabled the proposals of the Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument, 
which were then referred to by Germany as potential 
'Vertragspartnerschaften'. This explains the different reactions to the 
proposals. The European Parliament was rather sceptical towards the 
proposal, probably for fears about its role in contractual agreements115, while 
the Council reacted more positively.116 The involvement of the European 
Parliament in contractual agreements does not seem to be a likely scenario 
considering the experience with MoU-based conditionality programmes 
during the crisis. The role of EU institutions would even be marginal if 
Member States were to conclude inter se agreements among each other 
making it most likely that EU institutions will put forward the 
incompatibility of such agreements with the EU legal order. By contrast, the 
role of the national parliaments involved could be strengthened through inter 
se agreements creating stronger ownership and legitimacy of these 
agreements. As the MoU experience during the crisis has shown, legality 
review is a preeminent issue. If contractual agreements were based on EU law 
(i.e. if agreed as MoUs based on secondary legislation), they could be 
challenged on grounds of EU law, while if the agreements were not EU law 
only national courts could assess legality on the basis of national law.117 
 
Despite the blurry outlook on implementation given heterogeneity of 
interests, one should consider contractual agreements as an additional policy 
instrument from a normative perspective. It abandons the current purely 
sanction-based approach of policy coordination and provides new strategic 
offers to Member States by incorporating rewards either on financial (EU 
contractual agreements) or reciprocal (inter se agreements) basis. Also, 
consistency of policy tools is not likely to suffer given the frequency and 
visibility of recommendations issued under the EU semester.  
 
What about political feasibility of contractual agreements? The latest Five 
Presidents' Report does not explicitly refer to contractual agreements as a 
                                                 
115 European Parliament resolution on future legislative proposals on EMU: response to 
the Commission communications 2013/2609(RSP), 24-25. 
116 European Council Conclusions EUCO 217/13, 19/20 December 2013, para. 32. 
117 Kilpatrick (fn 72) 396, 407 discussing also the past experience with the reviewability 
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policy tool highlighting that this approach has recently lost support, which 
according to commentators is due to some Member States' resistance against 
this proposal. The vanishing support among Member States may also reflect 
the concern mainly of the net transfer beneficiaries of current EU financial 
support schemes that conditionality-based transfers would become the rule 
increasing the EU's scope of intervention with national policies. However, 
both Member States and EU should not set aside the option of contractual 
agreement without further ado. Member States would benefit from 
incentivizing mechanisms that are – from a political-economy perspective – 
more effective, as financial support is more persuasive to constituents than 
just being spared from sanctions. And the EU would enlarge its policy space 
by diversifying the tools available to improve compliance with EU economic 
rules. 
 
